The Faces of Public Schools: Relationships Among Unions, Ethnocentrism, and School Spending Support

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Abstract

As the majority of public-school students in the United States are now non-White (NCES 2017a), I test whether support for federal public school spending is related to racial and union attitudes, and whether these relationships strengthen over time. Using annual data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) from 1988 to 2016, I employ logistic regression to determine the likelihood that a respondent will support a federal school funding increase. I find that across all years and models, harboring a positive attitude towards unions significantly increases the odds of supporting an increase in federal school spending across all years. Using an additional state-level dataset, the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), I find that in 2016, being racially conservative significantly decreases the odds of supporting an increase in state school spending by 87%.

Introduction

Despite an environment of partisan rancor in Washington, D.C. that has surged in recent decades (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2010; Pew Research Center 2014), education policy has offered rare opportunities for bipartisan compromise (Houston 2019). Both No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2001 and the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) in 2015 passed with large bipartisan majorities (Hess and Eden 2017). For the past two decades, on education policy issues, Democrats and Republicans have been more willing to buck the party line and cooperate, though polling suggests partisan divides continue to widen (Cheng, Henderson, Peterson, and West 2018). This intra-party variation makes education policy issues uniquely suited for testing non-partisan predictors of public opinion. Party cues – signals from leaders telling Republicans and Democrats how they should feel about issues – provide clear positions on controversial matters from immigration to welfare. But on education policy issues, respondents may be subject to more crosscutting pressures as politicians from both parties cooperate (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1980; Shapiro and Bafumi 2009).

In other words, voters may not understand precisely what the Democratic or Republican position on any given education policy is because of this bipartisan cooperation. In this environment, the strength of partisan predictors (whether one self-identifies as either a Republican or a Democrat) may be weakened. In education, political partisans have stronger incentives to cooperate and develop policies that appeal to both liberals and conservatives. Charter schools, for example, appeal to both civil rights activists invested in better options for low-income and minoritized students, and also to conservatives, who believe in the primacy of free market forces. Other policies, such as greater school accountability, have found a home in both Republican and Democratic administrations dating back to the George H.W. Bush and Bill

Clinton administrations (Mehta 2013). The Obama administration in particular invested in the growth of charters, along with a host of other school reform accountability policies often championed by conservatives (Houston 2019; Payne and Knowles 2009).

Because of this bipartisan consensus across different administrations, long-held assumptions about support for public schools are now more contested. The modest success of the charter movement, school choice, and other alternative models of public schooling have convinced some Democrats to support traditionally conservative positions. Democrats can also be responsive to information about spending levels and consequently adopt more conservative positions (Houston 2019). Furthermore, the traditional public school is no longer dominant in major metropolitan areas; some heavily Democratic cities such as New Orleans and Detroit have achieved majority charter status. Though charters represent only 5% of public schools (NCES, 2017b), they capture disproportionate media attention (Scott 2009). These policies, amplified by media effects, may be influencing opinion on public schooling writ large.

Rather than examine these well-worn education policy controversies, I instead examine public opinion towards education spending more generally. In the context of these shifting ideological positions, I investigate whether ethnocentrism and attitudes towards unions can predict a person's stance on school spending. Ethnocentrism is the readiness to "reduce society to us versus them" (Kinder and Kam 2009, 8). For example, ethnocentrism, more specifically racial resentment, help explains individual opposition to welfare spending (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Gilens 1996; Goren 2008). Symbolic racism generates opposition to government spending on social welfare programs when White voters perceive that Blacks disproportionately benefit (Sears and Henry 2005). These welfare spending studies demonstrate that media

emphasis on Black welfare recipients (most infamously, the "welfare queen" stereotype) can racialize White public opinion of social programs.

Similarly, media coverage of demographic changes in America's public schools often begins as this article does: "This school year, America's schools are projected to reach a demographic milestone: For the first time, a majority of students in K-12 schools will be children of color" (Maxwell 2014). The title of Maxwell's article, which includes the paradoxical phrase "majority-minority," communicates a loss of status for White students and families. In light of this demographic change, I ask whether racial resentment has become more predictive over time for how individuals respond to a federal school spending question on the American National Election Survey (ANES). I analyze the ANES from 1988 to 2016 to uncover trends over time. Ascertaining these relationships, and visualizing how they might be developing over time in response to shifting public school demographics, is critical to understanding opposition to school spending increases.

Who Might Oppose Public School Spending and Why?

Racial resentment as a measure has been thoroughly tested and validated over decades (Carmines, Sniderman, and Easter 2011). Prior studies have shown that voters have generally positive attitudes towards increased social spending, with the exception of welfare programs that tap into racial stereotypes (Goren 2008; Jacoby 2000). Both White Democrats and White Republicans can support social spending if such spending is seen as not benefitting one race over another, though Republicans are significantly less likely than Democrats to support increased "government funding" of schools (Houston 2019). In other areas such as housing policy (i.e., whether to pass anti-discrimination laws in housing), evidence of race-based thinking has disappeared over time (Goren 2008; 2003).

But I hypothesize that as the demographics of school districts change, ethnocentrism may become newly salient in public school funding conversations. Public schooling itself may now been seen through a racialized lens or frame (see: Winter 2008). More recent literature establishes that some White voters prefer nothing over something – they favor decreased spending for programs seen to benefit minorities, even if these programs simultaneously benefit Whites (Krimmel and Rader 2017). According to Krimmel and Rader (2017), this voting bloc believes that Whites receive disproportionately fewer benefits of social programs, even when such programs are designed to benefit everyone.

Thus, as the United States school-aged population becomes more diverse, support for public school funding may be in decline among Whites. Exposure to racial difference may also be driving down support for school spending (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005). Since schools in the United States are primarily funded through state and local property taxes, local opinion drives spending (McGuire and Papke 2015). School spending cuts are deeply unpopular (see Figure 1), but they still occur during economic downturns as part of a rhetoric of fiscal responsibility (Leachman and Mai 2014). Kinder and Mendelberg (2000) claim that programs for the generally poor and needy are not subject to the same sorts of racial bias. But voters may now see the public school itself as a race-conscious program – a program benefitting one race more than another (Feldman and Huddy 2005).

On the other hand, voters' attitudes towards unions might be a better explanation for a reluctance to increase funding, as voters may see taxpayer money benefitting adults more than children (e.g., Riley 2019). If such voters see public schools as inefficient and wasteful (in line with traditionally conservative opinions towards government), the strength of this relationship

might help disprove my ethnocentric hypothesis. I discuss the literature on teachers' unions in the next subsection.

Teachers' Unions

Considering their size and scope, teachers' unions are "major political forces at all levels of American government when official decisions are made about the policies, organization, funding, and reform of the public schools" (Moe and Wiborg 2017, p. 4). They remain a potent political force despite being on the defensive in recent decades in both developed and less-developed nations. Across the globe, teachers' unions have resisted an agenda often described as neoliberal, which emphasizes a degree of increased accountability, decentralization, and school choice (p. 3; see also Cohen, Spillane, and Peurach 2018). This emphasis on performance, as measured by student achievement, is a "historically new emphasis" (Moe and Wiborg 2017). With few exceptions, teachers' unions have resisted this agenda of reform in favor of what Moe (2015) describes as their own vested interests. Unions prefer the status quo with existing benefits instead of dramatic policy change, and this preference has been demonstrated across the literature and on a national scale (Flavin and Hartney, 2015; Finger 2017; Moe 2015). Moe (2017) groups the vested interests of teachers' unions into five broad categories: salary rules, transfer rules, layoff rules, evaluation rules, and dismissal rules.

Considering their political power, voters may implicitly be evaluating teachers' unions on these issues when considering how much to fund schools. Perceptions of public sector unions as wasteful or expensive may also be driving down support for school spending as suggested by Anzia and Moe (2014), but relatively little literature tests this hypothesis. Though correlational, this study seeks to address this gap. Unions and collective bargaining do increase the costs of governments (Anzia and Moe 2014). Lovenheim and Willén (2018) also demonstrate negative

long-term labor market effects for students in states with collective bargaining, particularly among males and minoritized groups. Thus, someone with anti-union attitudes might vote against school spending if they perceive additional funding as being misused. Finally, unions in the public sector clash with Republican and conservative ideals about the efficiency of markets (Strunk, Cowen, Goldhaber, Marianno, Kilbride, and Theobald 2018; Tetlock, Veider, Patil, and Grant 2013).

School Spending Composition and Additional Data

Federal school spending, the dependent variable of interest on the ANES, represents a small proportion of average public school expenditures (only about 8%). State revenue represents the largest share (47%), followed by local revenue in the form of property taxes (45%) (Leachman, Masterson, and Figueroa 2017). There is no longitudinal dataset available comparable to the ANES that asks about state funding on public schools. However, I am able to analyze a dataset that asks a state spending question in 2016 – the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). I supplement my ANES findings and compare them to state spending attitudes on the CCES in 2016.

One major limitation of this study is my inability to test whether these preferences on both the ANES and the CCES simply reflect a desire for lower taxes (property taxes represent nearly half of school budgets in the United States, and even more in affluent school districts) (Leachman, Masterson, and Figueroa 2018). These surveys do not ask *why* respondents prefer or do not prefer an increase school spending. But I attempt through the inclusion of multiple covariates and contrasting models to isolate other possible explanations. I next summarize the two main hypotheses driving this study.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

In Figure 2, only 10% of CCES respondents in 2016 actively want to decrease state education spending. Why, then, are funding increases politically difficult to achieve (see: Leachman, Masterson, and Figueroa 2017)? The simplest explanation may be fiscal realities dependent on larger macroeconomic conditions. But I consider another explanation, that a minority of voters – who may have strong negative feelings about unions, or about racial and ethnic outgroups, or both – are politically active enough to thwart school spending increases. These are speculations, but this correlational study represents a foundational step towards potential survey experiments that would lend themselves to causal inference.

Considering the literature, I test two hypotheses that focus on both union attitudes (Moe 2015) and ethnocentrism in voting. While I cannot measure the racial composition of each respondent's local school district, I theorize that some voters think that public schools disproportionately benefit those who are either lower-income or minoritized. My second hypothesis is that voters may see teachers' unions as the face of public schools – they may not want to throw additional money at public schools that are unionized.

I hypothesize, then, that when partisan signals are ambiguous, racial and union attitudes will become more salient in predicting how voters will react to school spending proposals. My research questions are as follows:

1. To what extent do union attitudes and racial resentment significantly decrease or increase the odds that an ANES respondent will support an increase in federal school spending?
    a. How do these relationships change over time, if at all?
2. To what extent does union membership and racial conservatism significantly decrease or increase the odds that a CCES respondent will support an increase in state school spending in 2016?

Data and Measures

For research question 1, I analyze the question on the ANES that asks, "Should federal spending on public schools be increased, kept the same, or decreased?" where 1 = decrease, 2 = keep the same, and 3 = increase. I included respondents from presidential election years from 1988 to 2016, with the exclusion of 1996, when racial resentment questions were not asked. I weighted the results according to ANES guidelines, but the ANES sample size is relatively small – at times, there is only one respondent in some of the sampling strata (states). I treated these instances as certainty units.

I used presidential election year data from 1988 to 2016 data, omitting 1996 since racial resentment questions were not asked during that year. The ANES racial resentment scale, where Cronbach's α=0.93, asks four questions: 1) Do conditions make it difficult for Blacks to succeed? 2) Should Blacks have special favors to succeed? 3) Should Blacks try harder to succeed? and 4) Have Blacks gotten less than they deserve over the past few years? Respondents answer on a 1-5 scale, where 1 = strongly agree (or disagree), and 5 = strongly disagree (or agree). I reverse coded questions as necessary to create the scale. I also added union attitudes to my models to test my second hypothesis, where respondents rank their feelings towards unions on a 0-100 thermometer scale.

As for the second dataset, the independent variables used in the CCES do not neatly match the ANES. I am, however, able to include whether a respondent is a union member (as opposed to attitudes), whether a respondent has a child under 18, and homeownership. Houston (2019) finds tentative evidence that having a child reduces partisan polarization. The racial construct on the CCES is known as racial conservatism, rather than racial resentment. It consists of four items, asking whether respondents are "angry that racism exists" and if "White people in

the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin." The final two questions ask if respondents are fearful of other races and if "racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations." In order to boost the Cronbach's α to an acceptable level (0.67) after conducting an item-level factor analysis, I created a three-item construct that omitted the "fearful of other races" item. Thus, racial conservatives in this study are those who a) are not angry about the existence of racism, b) believe that White people do not have special advantages, and c) think that racial problems in the U.S. are rare and isolated.

As for the CCES dependent variable, I was only able to use 2016 data, the only year the state spending question was asked. The CCES asked, "State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on education?" Respondents answered on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = greatly decrease, 2 = slightly increase, 3 = maintain, 4 = slightly increase and 5 = slightly increase (I inverted this scale from the original for ease of interpretation). I also consolidated the majority of respondents (63.17%, shown in Figure 2) who selected "increase" into a single variable in order to run a logistic regression. Because of the much higher sample size of the CCES compared to the ANES, I was able to include state fixed effects in my model, and these effects were statistically significant for most states.

Methods and Models

The equation for the ANES multinomial logit model is as follows:

$$\eta_{ij} = log\frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_{iJ}} = \alpha_j + x_i'\beta_j$$

where α_j is a constant and β_j is a vector of coefficients, for j = 1 (decrease spending), 2 (same spending), or 3 (increase spending). I considered several interaction variables, but none of these were significant or improved the models (i.e., White x College, White x Racial

Resentment, Republican x Conservative). I also tested a logistic regression model, where 0 represents "decrease" or "the same" spending, and 1 represents "increase spending" (the majority position). The responses are highly skewed in favor of increased spending support; Figure 1 maps the percentages of respondents for each category over time, which shows an increasing share of respondents selecting "more spending" at the expense of "same spending" respondents.

I selected variables supported by a long-standing body of political science literature – self-identified party identification, self-identified ideological conservatism, belonging to a union, homeownership, identifying as White, and family income (see Campbell et al. 1980; Houston 2019). I expected that some of these variables would be statistically significant. For example, I hypothesize that respondents with a Bachelor's degree or higher will be more likely to support increased school spending, as they might place a higher value on education. I also expect that homeownership will be predictive of an anti-spending attitude, as the primary funding mechanism for U.S. public education is local property taxes (NCES, 2017c).

I considered several other variables and models. I tested models using both binary and scale items. I tested models using different degrees of partisanship and different scales (i.e., all Democrats compared to a model distinguishing Strong Democrats) and found no significant differences or improvement in the models. There were significant correlations (as high as 0.367) among some of the items where one would expect (i.e., Republican and conservative), but these variables were not collinear. None of these alterations to the models changed the patterns of significance or improved the fit.

In interpreting the results, I caution against overinterpreting the ANES results from 2004, as several respondents were not asked the racial resentment questions, resulting in a low *n* value with a high standard error. I did not consider it to be appropriate to use multiple imputation to

correct for nonresponse considering that racial resentment is a primary variable of interest. I report all results using either the relative risk or the odds ratio.

Results

Table 1 provides the results of the multinomial logistic regression for the ANES, where increasing federal school spending (the majority opinion) is the reference group. Identifying as conservative significantly increases the relative risk of wanting to decrease federal school spending in every year. Conservatives are nearly 5 times as likely to support a decrease in 2016 (a relative risk factor of 4.845, which increases from 2.517 in 1988). Thus, the relationship between conservatism and federal school spending attitudes has nearly doubled over time. Additionally, each year of age increases the relative risk by a factor of 1.025 in both 2008 and 2016. This risk is relatively stable over time.

Also, for the decrease category (1), identifying as White increases the relative risk only in 1988 and 2004, but there are large standard errors in both years because of the sample size. Union attitudes, measured on a 0 to 100 scale, decrease the relative risk by a factor of 0.983 in 1998, which shrinks over time to 0.964 in 2016. Thus, having extremely positive attitudes towards unions (100 out of a possible 100) results in almost no risk of supporting a decrease in federal public school spending.

When looking at the second category (2) – maintaining the same amount of spending – I find a relationship between Republicans that becomes nonsignificant over time, and a relationship with conservatism that grows over time. Republicans are at a relative risk of maintaining current spending by a factor of 1.808 in 1988, but this risk becomes nonsignificant over time. The pattern reverses for conservatives; they are at a relative risk by a factor of 1.396 in 1988, which increases to 2.106 by 2016. Being White increases the relative risk by a factor of

1.499 in 1988, and this is relatively constant over time (though not significant in every year). Age becomes nonsignificant in 2016, but the relative risk is 1.019 in 1988 and relatively constant through 2008. For racial resentment, the relative risk is significant in 1992 (a factor of 1.115), in 2004 (1.457), and in 2008 (1.205). Thus, in 2008 (the year President Obama was first elected), a person is at a significantly higher relative risk of supporting the same amount of federal spending by a factor of 0.847 for each additional increase in racial resentment.

Looking at Table 2, the results are similar when looking at the odds ratio for the increase spending group compared to the remaining two categories. Republicans have significantly lower odds of supporting increased spending from 1988 to 2004; they were 31-43% less likely to want an increase during those years. The conservative odds are significant in every year and increase over time; they are 33% less likely to support an increase in 1988, which increases to 59% in 2016. Whites have significantly lower odds of supporting an increase in some but not all years. Increasing the age of the respondent significantly decreases the odds of supporting a sending increase, and this relationship is relatively stable over time. For ease of interpretation, I graph the coefficients for these variables over time in Figure 3, which demonstrates the growing importance of self-identifying as a conservative.

In both 1988 and 2008, the odds of a 50-year-old supporting a spending increase is nearly 0. Racial resentment significantly decreases the odds of supporting an increase in 1992, 2004, and 2008. Finally, expressing pro-union attitudes significantly increases the odds of supporting an increase, and this relationship increases over time (from 1.009 in 1988 to 1.018 in 2016). Considering that this factor is cumulative for each additional point of positive feeling, this finding confirms my union attitudes hypothesis.

As for the CCES results in Table 3, Republicans are actually significantly more likely to support a state spending increase in the logit model by a factor of 1.567. Conservatives, however, are significantly less likely to support increases by a factor of 0.577, though conservatives and Republicans are significantly and positively correlated (Pearson's r=0.474). Homeownership is significant (factor of 0.899), but income is not. Identifying as White increases the odds of supporting a state spending increase by a factor of 1.297. Having at least a 4-year degree also significantly increases the odds of supporting an increase in the logit model by a factor of 1.199. Having a child under eighteen significantly increases the odds of supporting a spending increase by a factor of 1.475, as does being a union member by a factor of 1.127. Age is also significant; each year of age increases the odds of supporting a state spending increase by a factor of 1.009. The largest predictor is racial conservatism, which drastically reduces the odds by a factor of 0.133, or 87%. Racial conservatism is the best predictor for whether someone does not support a spending increase in state funding – the z value is quite large at -67.03. This final finding provides strong support for the ethnocentric hypothesis.

I conclude with the map in Figure 4, which depicts those states where respondents are significantly more likely to support a state spending increase. States in the South, which have larger African American populations, are significantly less likely to support a state spending increase on public schools.

Discussion

Kinder and Kam (2009) argue, "ethnocentrism is a mental habit" (2). If it is habitual, then we should expect to find it affecting a whole range of opinions on public policy – even those such as school spending that do not specifically ask about race and ethnicity, and which seem to benefit all students. I find strong evidence to support the ethnocentric hypothesis using the

CCES, as well as the 2008 results for the ANES (when Barack Obama was first on the presidential ballot). In Table 2, racially resentful Whites in 2008 have significantly lower odds of supporting a federal school spending increase. But these findings do not appear again in 2016. It may be the case that the candidacy of Barack Obama increased the strength of some of these relationships in 2008, consistent with other literature (e.g., Tesler 2012). Whiteness alone, controlling for all other factors, significantly decreases the odds of supporting a spending increase in 1988, 1992, and 2008, similar to other research (e.g., Kinder and Kam 2009; Krimmel and Rader 2017).

I also find compelling and consistent evidence that confirms the union hypothesis when using both the ANES and the CCES. Positive union attitudes are significantly and strongly related to federal public school spending support, and this relationship doubles in magnitude over time according to Tables 1 and 2. Additionally, union members responding to the CCES also are significantly more likely to support state school spending increases.

If the public is interpreting support for more public school spending as support for public school unions, it would be wise to investigate how to decouple these attitudes in the minds of voters. If the goal is to ensure adequate and equitable public school funding at the federal and state levels, both ethnocentric and negative union attitudes may be impeding progress. The racially conservatism items on the CCES, however, may better capture racial animus. Unlike the ANES questions, the CCES questions do not ask about Black/White racism but rather ask questions about White privilege. Considering the magnitude of the racial conservatism relationship, belief in White privilege may be a better predictor for understanding varying level of funding support for public schools.

An important caveat to national survey findings is the local nature of school funding and on-the-ground realities, which are highly heterogeneous. Different relationships may hold true in different states, though I have controlled for state differences in all of my models. Still, voters in New Hampshire have unusually direct control over school budgets, for example, whereas other states can issue school bonds without a vote. Thus, this issue is one that requires study at the local level as well – those who do not support state or federal spending may simply want more money to come from local governments, which could enable greater local control. Figure 4 shows that these differences are also regional in nature. No data exists testing all of these various hypothesis against each other, or how people might rank their funding preferences – federal, state, or local. I highlight this limitation as an important area for future research.

We cannot expect to achieve more equitable school funding if we do not have a sense of who is opposed to funding public education at the federal level, how often they are voting, and what percentage of the public they represent. The public is clearly trending towards greater spending at the federal and state levels, which correlates with public support for teacher strikes (Campbell 2019). There is still some bipartisan consensus on education policy, to which politicians responded by repealing NCLB and replacing it with ESSA. But attitudes towards local teachers' unions, and the racial composition of respondents' school districts, may be influencing school funding debates. Advocates for greater spending at the federal level would be wise to tend towards improving public attitudes towards unions broadly speaking, particularly in an environment of continuing teacher strikes and union membership decline (Marianno and Strunk 2018).

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Figure 1
Percentage of ANES Respondents by Year Who State that Federal Public School Funding Should Be Decreased, Kept the Same, or Increased



Figure 2
Percentage of CCES Respondents in 2016 Who State that State School Spending Should Be Decreased, Kept the Same, or Increased



Figure 3

Log Odds of Supporting a Federal Public School Funding Increase Over Time



Figure 4

States Where Respondents are Significantly More Likely to Support a State Spending Increase



Table 1: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Decrease, Same, or Increase Federal School Spending

	1988	1992	2000	2004	2008	2016
1						
Republican	1.352	1.354	1.439	1.009	1.055	1.679
	(0.387)	(0.351)	(0.393)	(0.351)	(0.303)	(0.682)
Conservative	2.517**	1.851*	1.697	10.797**	2.955**	4.845**
	(0.754)	(0.477)	(0.466)	(4.858)	(0.688)	(1.897)
Union	1.011	0.885	1.228	0.965	1.020	2.511
	(0.445)	(0.323)	(0.436)	(0.414)	(0.368)	(1.404)
Homeowner	1.148	1.678	1.305	1.592	0.613	0.521
	(0.409)	(0.517)	(0.480)	(0.640)	(0.230)	(0.213)
Income (0-5)	1.064	1.017	0.878	1.376	1.334	1.299
	(0.164)	(0.129)	(0.141)	(0.298)	(0.250)	(0.226)
White	9.588*	2.085	1.747	15.301**	1.296	1.363
	(9.649)	(0.825)	(0.814)	(12.619)	(0.454)	(0.572)
College	1.613	1.672	2.147*	1.353	1.718*	1.568
	(0.510)	(0.455)	(0.636)	(0.477)	(0.443)	(0.552)
Age	1.033**	1.015*	1.011	0.998	1.025**	1.025**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)
RResent (1-5)	1.230	1.247	1.242	1.603*	1.057	1.032
	(0.201)	(0.170)	(0.206)	(0.308)	(0.141)	(0.212)
Union Att.	0.983**	0.987**	0.974**	0.962**	0.971**	0.964**
(0-100)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)
2						
Republican	1.808**	1.357*	1.444*	1.701**	1.113	1.248
	(0.236)	(0.163)	(0.222)	(0.337)	(0.210)	(0.369)
Conservative	1.396**	1.370**	0.884	1.629**	2.073**	2.106**
	(0.176)	(0.157)	(0.162)	(0.307)	(0.320)	(0.587)
Union	1.205	1.015	0.798	0.998	1.036	1.473
	(0.186)	(0.145)	(0.157)	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.486)
Homeowner	1.024	1.063	1.389	1.111	1.081	1.029
	(0.143)	(0.125)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.173)	(0.250)

Income (0-5)	0.983	1.111*	1.007	1.108	0.991	0.873
	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.096)
White	1.499*	1.716**	1.300	1.521	1.451*	1.358
	(0.244)	(0.255)	(0.267)	(0.368)	(0.225)	(0.346)
College	0.861	1.105	0.778	0.874	0.633*	1.002
	(0.130)	(0.144)	(0.130)	(0.175)	(0.113)	(0.221)
Age (Years)	1.019**	1.020**	1.027**	1.029**	1.020**	1.002
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)
RResent (1-5)	1.061	1.115*	1.027	1.457**	1.205*	1.116
	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.077)	(0.135)	(0.097)	(0.105)
Union Att.	0.992**	0.995*	0.993*	0.993*	0.987**	0.986**
(0-100)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)
N	1578	2019	1278	926	1897	1033

The dependent variable is 1, 2, or 3, 1 = less spending, 2 = same, 3 = more. 3, Democrats, and liberals are the reference group.
Exponentiated coefficients are relative risk ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Logistic Regression Results for Increase Federal School Spending

	1988	1992	2000	2004	2008	2016
Republican	0.569**	0.736**	0.691**	0.618**	0.910	0.757
	(0.072)	(0.085)	(0.097)	(0.115)	(0.154)	(0.201)
Conservative	0.673**	0.704**	0.955	0.487**	0.447**	0.413**
	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.156)	(0.087)	(0.063)	(0.103)
Union	0.846	1.000	1.151	0.998	0.969	0.622
	(0.127)	(0.138)	(0.202)	(0.220)	(0.189)	(0.191)
Homeowner	0.966	0.897	0.731	0.885	1.028	1.110
	(0.131)	(0.102)	(0.119)	(0.182)	(0.162)	(0.249)
Income (1-5)	1.010	0.909	1.025	0.886	0.953	1.076
	(0.063)	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.111)
White	0.623**	0.574**	0.738	0.565*	0.705*	0.743
	(0.100)	(0.082)	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.102)	(0.174)
College	1.076	0.859	1.013	1.037	1.212	0.904
	(0.155)	(0.107)	(0.155)	(0.194)	(0.190)	(0.180)
Age (Years)	0.980**	0.981**	0.977**	0.974**	0.979**	0.994
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
R. Resent	0.928	0.885*	0.933	0.678**	0.847*	0.901
	(0.061)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.082)
Union Att.	1.009**	1.006**	1.011**	1.011**	1.016**	1.018**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)
N	1578	2019	1278	926	1897	1033

The dependent variable is 0 or 1, where 1 = less spending. 3, Democrats, and liberals are the reference group. Exponentiated coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Weighted Logistic Regression Results for Increase State Spending

	Increase Spending (0 or 1)
Republican	1.567**
	(0.066)
Conservative	0.577**
	(0.021)
Homeowner	0.899**
	(0.030)
Level of Income (1-5)	1.016
	(0.011)
White	1.257**
	(0.045)
College-Educated	1.199**
	(0.034)
Child Under 18	1.475**
	(0.049)
Union Member	1.127**
	(0.037)
Age (Years)	1.009**
	(0.001)
Racial Cons. (>2.50)	0.133**
	(0.004)
Constant	1.801**
	(0.249)
N	64600
pseudo R^2	0.187